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Article Series
Credit scoring has brought increased efficiency in the mortgage lend-
ing industry. It has also raised concerns about fair mortgage lending
practices given the increasing use of credit scores in the underwriting
process. In order to better understand the potential impact of credit
scoring  on  mortgage  applicants,  The  Federal  Reserve  System’s
Mortgage Credit Partnership Credit Scoring Committee is producing a
five-part article series. The series is designed to provide the mortgage
lending industry, and concerned groups and individuals, the opportuni-
ty to present their perspectives on credit scoring and its relation to fair
mortgage lending. The first article in this series appears in this issue. It
includes the viewpoints of representatives from Freddie Mac, The
American Bankers Association, Calvin Bradford and Associates, and
Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc. 
A r o u n d   N e w   E n g l a n d 1 9
C o h o u s i n g : A New Kind of Old Neighborhood 
Cohousing is a housing development trend that is gaining wider accep-
tance within New England and the United States. In order to preserve
a sense of community and connectedness within their neighborhoods,
cohousing proponents in the United States have modeled their devel-
opments on those in Denmark. Often cohousing developments include
a wide variety of residents, including lower-income households. In this
issue, we look at how cohousing is spreading in Massachusetts.   
C o m p l i a n c e C o r n e r 2 2
Regulatory Q&A
Regulatory Q&Adiscusses a variety of topics including payday lending,
notifications regarding private mortgage insurance (PMI), individual
development accounts (IDAs), and other issues.Credit scoring is an underwriting tool used to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of prospective borrowers. Utilized for several decades with
respect to certain forms of consumer credit, scoring has come into com-
mon use in the mortgage lending industry only within the last ten years.
Scoring brings a high level of efficiency to the underwriting process, but
it has also raised concerns about fair lending with regard to historically
underserved populations. 
In order to explore the potential impact of credit scoring on mort-
gage applicants, the Federal Reserve System’s Mortgage Credit
Partnership Credit Scoring Committee is producing a five-part article
series. This is the first article in the series.
Background
An important set of initiatives in the Federal Reserve System
known collectively as the Mortgage Credit Projects (MCPs) was
launched in 1996 by the Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, NewYork,
St. Louis, and San Francisco. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
launched its MCP in 1993 and had a follow-up project in Cincinnati
beginning in 1996.  The MCP programs were designed to identify and
address barriers to both mortgage credit and fair housing, within tradi-
tionally underserved market demographic profiles and communities.
The MCPs engaged a cross-section of housing industry profes-
sionals to examine various aspects of the home-buying process.  The pur-
pose was to identify areas or steps that might give rise to, or create the
potential for, disparities between majority and minority homebuyers and
borrowers in the home search or credit application process.  With each
project, and around each topic, complex and often heated dialogue arose.
Topics such as racial steering, the effect of a neighborhood’s racial make-
up on appraisals, and the effect (or lack) of affinity between borrower
and lender were confronted by a cross-section of practitioners in the vari-
ous housing-related industries.  In each program, task groups were
formed to address specific issues, such as access to homeowners’ insur-
ance, fair appraisal practices, fair lending practices, and the impact of
specific policies on communities.
MCP Methodology
Each of the Reserve Banks recruited housing and mortgage indus-
try organizations as partners in the MCP process.  The design was to
have practitioners discuss the home purchase and financing process, to
break the process into steps and determine where the potential for
unequal treatment or discrimination arises.  From within the partnering
organizations, practitioners — those making line decisions on a daily
basis — were recruited to participate in task groups.  These task groups
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2were formed around particular issues and key steps in the home-
buying process (such as obtaining hazard insurance) where con-
cerns had been identified. The task groups met over a period of
months to develop recommendations, which were issued in pub-
lications from each Reserve Bank.  MCP reports from the indi-
vidual Reserve Banks are available upon request. 
Some important results were achieved in each of the
markets where MCPs were conducted.  For example, in Boston,
practitioners, regulators, and advocates worked on several edu-
cational and outreach efforts. The Boston-based Citizens
Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) worked with the
Boston Reserve Bank and the Fannie Mae Foundation to devel-
op a standardized homebuyer education curriculum for use
throughout the Boston metropolitan area. The Boston MCP also
created a web site (www.baystatehomebuyer.com) for first-time
homebuyers, lenders, and realtors to access information on affordable mortgage prod-
ucts and other homeownership resources. 
In St. Louis, two insurance agents opened offices in lower-income communi-
ties.  In Cleveland, real estate boards, historically divided by race, now share listings
and other key information on a systematic basis for the first time.  In Chicago, a fore-
closure intervention program, targeted to low-income communities disproportionately
affected by FHA mortgage defaults, has kept well over 200 families out of foreclosure
to date.  In NewYork state, fair lending training is now required in the licensing
process for appraisers.  And in San Francisco, revised fair lending “best practices”
agreements were initiated between lenders and HUD.
Issues Identified in the MCP Process of National Concern
As an added step to these projects, representatives from the Reserve Banks
that conducted MCPs met to exchange their individual findings and experiences and
also to discuss areas of common concern.  Among the issues of common concern
were access to home-owner’s insurance, appraisals in redeveloping communities,
steering by real estate agents, and the use of credit-scoring technology in the mort-
gage underwriting process.  The last is the subject of this article, which will provide
the context for a series of articles to follow on the issue of fair mortgage lending prac-
tices involving the use of credit-scoring technology. The Federal Reserve Banks of
Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Cleveland, and the Federal Reserve Board have rep-
resentatives on the research committee and are participating in the series.
Background on Credit Scoring Issues Examined
To gain an understanding of industry, advocacy group, and regulator concerns,
the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco conducted focus
groups in their home cities in the winter of 1998.  The findings of these focus groups
were then written up and used by the committee members to develop nine issue state-
ments that encapsulated the findings of the focus groups.  The nine issue statements
follow.
1. In developing credit scoring policies, a lender may neglect to:
a) establish clear risk-tolerance policies and consistent guidelines for 
how scoring cutoffs are determined and loans are priced; 
b) ensure that the model accurately reflects the characteristics/
demographics of its applicant pool.
32. New models are unlikely to include prohibited basis factors in their programs.  
However, if models are not well-constructed and updated over time, they could:
a) produce unjustifiable disparate impact; or
b) become based on a pool of borrowers that is incompatible with a lender’s
market demographics.
3. Some third-party brokers who fail to comply with fair lending laws may be censured 
or have their lending licenses placed in jeopardy.  It is important that lenders monitor 
the practices of their third-party brokers, especially for compliance with fair lending 
laws, pricing policies, and the use of credit-scoring models.  Lenders who knowingly
work with noncompliant brokers (and take no action) may be liable as 
co-creditors.
4. Inadequate staff training and oversight regarding bank credit policy and fair 
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Bank Policy Development Application Process 
The flow chart below offers a basic interpretation of a credit-scored mortgage loan.  This chart does no
those steps where poorly crafted or managed credit scoring policies/practices could result in f5. Lack of information regarding the credit (application) process and available 
loan options could dissuade an applicant from completing the application 
process.  Loan officers who fail to notify the applicant of the nature of a credit 
rating, and the important role it plays in the approval and pricing of a loan, could
unfairly deny or overcharge an otherwise worthy applicant.
6. Credit/mortgage scoring systems are only as effective as the data fed into 
them. Inaccurate or incomplete data regarding an applicant’s income or credit 
history may adversely affect the applicant’s mortgage score.  In the process of 
ensuring accurate data, lenders must treat all applicants consistently.  For exam-
ple, assistance with credit (report) corrections or accounting for protected or 
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 not attempt to provide a comprehensive view of all the steps in the loan process.  Rather, it is intended to illustrate
n fair lending violations.  The numbers correspond to the nine issue statements from the 1998 focus groups. 7. Credit scoring and counteroffers can serve as important functions to maximize
access to credit.  However, their nature and usage could result in unlawful discrimination.  
The need for frequent score overrides could indicate a larger problem with the scoring sys-
tem. Furthermore, inconsistency in utilizing either “high-side” or “low-side” overrides to 
alter a credit decision may result in disparate treatment.  Finally, inconsistent counteroffers
made to applicants who received essentially identical scores may also result in disparate 
treatment on a prohibited basis as defined in fair lending regulations.  
8. If a lender engages in a subjective second review process, inconsistent practices could 
result in disparate treatment of applicants.  Discriminatory disparities may result from the 
absence of established and carefully observed second review guidelines that specify:
a) the bottom-level mortgage score of applications subject to second review; and
b) explicit procedures and explanations of judgmental factors, covering most or all 
contingencies. 
9. Lenders who do not track loan performance based on their established credit scoring 
model characteristics may rely on risk limits that are unnecessarily restrictive and may also 
produce an unjustifiable disparate impact on prohibited basis group applicants.
The chart on pages 4 and 5 illustrates the process a credit-scored mortgage typically goes
through; it also includes the development of a risk management policy. The issues identified in the
1998 focus groups, and the flow chart, were used as exhibits in a survey of industry leaders con-
ducted in 1999.  Among the survey responses were the following.
In developing policy:
• Changes over a business cycle in the environment of a lender can affect the predic-
tive ability of a credit-scoring model; a bank should have a clear methodology for 
changing its cutoff scores.
• Banks should have a clear plan for handling applicants who do not have estab-
lished credit and would therefore score poorly with most credit-scoring models. 
In dealing with loan applicants:
• Some lenders may provide advice to an applicant, such as closing or paying down 
credit lines, with the intent of improving the applicant’s credit score, which may
actually affect the credit score negatively.
• Accuracy of credit reports may vary among population segments; lenders should  
be cognizant of the potential need to verify credit report information when the 
information will be used to score the applicant.
Two additional focus groups, using the findings of the survey as a basis for further discus-
sion, were conducted in Washington D.C. in the spring of 1999.  Based on the findings of this
research, the Credit Scoring Committee elected to develop a five-part article series to highlight
some of the key issues identified with respect to credit scoring and fair lending.  Each article will
appear on a quarterly basis in this magazine and other Reserve Bank publications. An important
goal of this series is to provide the industry, and concerned groups and individuals, the opportunity
to comment on their own related concerns. This introductory article incorporates statements that we
requested from the following organizations, selected because of their interest in and differing per-
spectives on credit scoring and fair lending.
•  Freddie Mac;
• The American Bankers Association;
•  Calvin Bradford and Associates;
•  Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc.
6
result in disparate treatment of applicants.  Discriminatory disparities may result from the 
absence of established and carefully observed second review guidelines that specify:Representatives from each of these organizations received a request to comment on the 
following statement:
A variety of research studies, emanating from the Federal Reserve System, other reg-
ulatory and government institutions, and private research organizations, have suggested 
unexplained variances in mortgage acceptance rates and pricing between majority and 
minority mortgage applicants.  Though not uniformly the focus of these studies, credit scor-
ing is now a commonly used tool in the mortgage underwriting process.  Credit-scoring 
advocates maintain that as an underwriting tool, credit scoring has allowed the underwrit-
ing function to be streamlined for highly creditworthy applicants, allowing human under
writers to allot more time to applications where credit issues are present, and has reduced 
overall costs of underwriting.  Detractors claim that factors considered within statistical 
credit-scoring models, even if not intended, favor majority applicants and create a new bar-
rier to homeownership for minority mortgage applicants.  Please describe, from your per-
spective, fair lending issues that might arise as a result of the use of credit-scoring technol-
ogy in the mortgage underwriting process and what your organization does to address these 
issues.
Once the comments were received, committee members edited them to capture the key
points made and to bring some level of uniformity to the length of each response. The original
respondents then approved the edited versions of their comments.  These edited comments are pre-
sented in the next section.
As a further exercise the respondents were then given the opportunity to comment on each
other's responses and to provide further insights.  The second round produced additional comments
from both Freddie Mac and Calvin Bradford and Associates. 
--by Michael V. Berry
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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The Federal Reserve System’s Mortgage Credit
Partnership Credit Scoring Committee members are as
follows:
credit-scoring models, even if not intended, favor majority applicants and create a new bar-
rier to homeownership for minority mortgage applicants.  Please describe, from your per-
spective, fair lending issues that might arise as a result of the use of credit-scoring technol-
ogy in the mortgage underwriting process and what your organization does to address these 
issues.Statement of Ellen P. Roche
Director of Corporate Relations,
Freddie Mac
An increasing number of consumers have benefited from the speed, accuracy, and fair treat-
ment provided by the use of credit scoring and automated underwriting over the last several years.
In addition to summarizing these benefits, we describe how automated underwriting and credit scor-
ing benefit the consumer during the mortgage application process. 
American families now enjoy more choice and opportunity in the mortgage market than ever.
Homebuying families can choose a mortgage product that meets their specific financing needs and
they can do so by telephone, on the Internet, or in a face-to-face transaction.  Loan approval proce-
dures, which once took many weeks, now take days.  The once time-consuming credit review
process now takes place in minutes, thanks to technologies that have automated the underwriting
process.
Manual underwriting characterized the mortgage market before the 1990s.  This slow process
provided only a limited ability to analyze multiple risk factors and sift through layered risks. Without
the ability to precisely measure distinctions in risk with speed and accuracy, lenders and investors
developed guidelines that broadly defined creditworthiness.  For decades these guidelines served well
the vast majority of mortgage borrowers in what came to be known as the prime market.  
Over the years, easier access to credit and a rising bankruptcy rate meant that an increasing
number of borrowers with blemished credit histories fell outside the mainstream that the industry’s
typical guidelines were able to address.  Some did not get mortgages.  Some resorted to the subprime
market. In either case, potential borrowers could not take advantage of the efficiencies available in
the prime sector.
Now, powerful tools are fundamentally changing the market’s ability to assess and manage
credit risk.  Automated underwriting now makes it possible to extend the efficiency of the prime 
market to those who have until now been beyond its reach. 
Instantaneous and Accurate Risk Assessment
Automated underwriting is one of the keys to opening new doors of opportunity, because it
allows for the instantaneous and accurate assessment of a multitude of risk factors.  Freddie Mac has
led the development of this critical tool, introducing the state-of-the-art automated underwriting ser-
vice, Loan Prospector‚ in 1995. 
The predictive power of automated underwriting helps lenders and borrowers alike.  It gives
lenders the tools they need to make more mortgages and reach out to new borrowers.  It gives con-
sumers confidence that mortgages are evaluated the same way, every time, for every borrower,
encouraging more borrowers to enter the housing finance system.
Automated Underwriting Revealed
Automated underwriting is necessary to provide a full picture of mortgage eligibility.
Automated underwriting is faster and fairer than manual underwriting and provides a more precise
evaluation of risk.  Credit is a very important part, but just a part, of the evaluation process.  Credit
scoring is the fastest and fairest way to evaluate credit. It has been proved predictive for all popula-
tion groups.  Credit scores evaluate previous credit performance, the current level of indebtedness,
the length of credit history, the types of credit in use, and the pursuit of new credit.  
Automated underwriting benefits consumers when applying for a mortgage in several 
different ways. 
8Access to the system: Consumers should not be rejected during a quick pre-application screen-
ing. Lenders should conduct a full analysis of their homeownership potential.  Freddie Mac discour-
ages lenders from using credit scores as a screening device because it does not provide a full picture
of the borrower’s ability to pay a mortgage.  Loan Prospector considers credit, collateral, and capacity
but does not consider race, age, or marital status, and thus it can provide a fair and thorough evalua-
tion of the mortgage in a few minutes.  
The proof of any underwriting system lies in its ability to assess risk — and Loan Prospector
has proved to be highly predictive of default for borrowers from all racial and ethnic groups and all
types of neighborhoods. Whether a borrower is African-American, Hispanic, or white, loans in the
lowest-risk groups performed significantly better over time than those in higher-risk groups. Because
it is blind to an applicant’s race and ethnicity, Loan Prospector promotes fair and consistent mortgage
lending decisions.  Moreover, Loan Prospector predicts well across income groups and neighborhoods
as well. Automated underwriting reduces the need to pre-screen mortgage applicants. 
Objective sources of information: Consumers should have access to credit counseling to help
them understand the risks and rewards of homeownership and to assist them in getting their mortgage
application approved.  Freddie Mac supports AHECI, NAACP, and the national Urban League as well
as other organizations that provide homeownership and financial literacy counseling. Consumers can
request their credit reports before applying for a mortgage to check the accuracy of their credit infor-
mation.  Consumers have the right to correct the credit information Loan Prospector uses in evaluating
credit history.
Full and fair information: Interest rate, payment amount, adjustable rates, late fees, and pre-
payment penalties need to be explained and understood.  Freddie Mac requires lenders to follow fair
credit and fair lending laws and also requires lenders to report when borrowers do pay their bills on
time, so borrowers can get credit for a job well done.
Fair lending practices: If borrowers are eligible for “A” mortgages, lenders should charge “A”
mortgage rates.  Freddie Mac’s Loan Prospector provides the lender with the lowest-risk mortgage rate
regardless of the lenders’classification of the mortgage.
Explanation for mortgage denial: Lenders should provide borrowers with information that can
guide them to improving their chances for acceptance.  Loan Prospector does not deny a mortgage
application.  On higher-risk loans, Loan Prospector requests additional support documentation and
requires the lender to share some of the higher risk.  Alternatively, Loan Prospector offers to purchase
the loan with additional fees to compensate for the additional risk.  In any case, Loan Prospector pro-
vides the lenders with feedback to guide them in improving their application. For example:
• If tax returns are used to document source of income or to verify income,
obtain signed IRS form from borrower; or
• Use stated income for qualification and obtain most recent year-to-date paystub to 
verify employment for borrower.
In addition Fair, Isaac scoring products also provide up to four reason codes, in order of impor-
tance, that indicate why a score is not higher.  For example, “derogatory public record or collection
filed,” or “amount owed on accounts is too high.”
While the techniques for evaluating risk have advanced, the general rules for improving your
credit and your ability to obtain a mortgage remain the same:
• Pay your bills on time;
• Keep your credit card balances low; and
• Make sure your credit records are accurate.
Using credit scoring as part of automated underwriting helps more borrowers get mortgages
because of the speed, accuracy, and fair treatment inherent in these tools.  If the alternative is
manual underwriting, there is no comparison.  
9Statement of Paul Smith
Senior Counsel,
The American Bankers Association
Actually, our bankers tell us that credit scoring in fact gives greater access to mortgage
credit rather than creating new barriers for minority mortgage applicants.  The use of credit-
scoring models to better predict whether an applicant might default allows the lender more flex-
ibility in making traditional home loans.  In the last 10 years, the banking industry has greatly
expanded its efforts to make credit available to less qualified applicants.  For example, the hous-
ing mortgage secondary market agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have broadened their
underwriting criteria to accept alternatives to the traditional qualifications.  Banks have started
lower-interest-rate or no-fee affordable housing programs, created first-time home-buyer pro-
grams in which borrower training replaces some of the missing qualifications of the borrower,
and expanded the list of qualifications for potential borrowers.  
Many bankers have also said that credit-scoring models have been crucial in permitting
banks to approve more borrowers' applications than traditional underwriting criteria would have.
All of them said that today they make home loans with the use of credit-scoring systems that
they could not have made or sold to the secondary mortgage market in the past.  None of the
bankers consulted for this comment reported using a credit-scoring system exclusively, but only
as part of the overall mortgage underwriting process. In a home mortgage loan, the property's
appraised value, the loan-to-value ratio, the available resources for closing costs and down pay-
ment, the applicant's disposable income, and other underwriting standards must all be factored
into the credit decision.  Nonetheless, use of a credit scoring system in the mortgage process is
increasing, not only because of the customers' demand for faster underwriting decisions but also
because of bankers' interest in expanding credit availability.  For example, a higher than
required credit score might allow the bank to accept a higher loan-to-value ratio than its general
lending policy permits.  This would permit the applicant to make a lower down payment and
thus make up for having fewer financial resources than the traditional applicant.  This kind of
increased flexibility in underwriting by bankers and the secondary market agencies has led to a
significant expansion in the access to mortgage credit in the 1990s.
Bank compliance officers have also said that the use of a validated credit-scoring system
by the bank reduces the subjectivity of the final credit decision and allows compliance officers
to better monitor fair lending compliance.  One example of that is described in the 1999 settle-
ment between the Department of Justice and Deposit Guaranty Bank (www.usdoj.gov/crt/hous-
ing/caselist.htm#lending).  Although the bank was said to be using credit scoring, the crux of
the case was that lending officers were allowed to freely override the credit score, that is, either
granting a loan that should not have been granted according to the score (a low-side override) or
not granting a loan that should have been granted according to the score (a high-side override).
Thus, the fair lending violations were not in the credit-scoring model but in not considering the
credit score in the lending decision.  The settlement also describes in detail how the successor
bank to Deposit Guaranty ensures fair lending compliance through several mechanisms, includ-
ing using a credit-scoring system.  Key to that bank's program (and many other banks' pro-
grams) is the use of credit scoring to ensure standard treatment of applicants, the limitation of
authority to override credit scores, and reviews of any such overrides as well as reviews of many
of the denied applications to determine if the bank has an alternative loan product or program
for which the applicant could be qualified.
Besides these and many other steps by banks to ensure fair lending and fair use of credit
scores, the bank regulatory agencies have detailed Fair Lending Examination Procedures that
require bankers and examiners to review credit-scoring models for validity and fairness.  These
examination procedures are available for review by the public at www.ffiec.gov/fairlend.pdf
with the Appendix on Credit Scoring Analysis at www.ffiec.gov/fairappx.pdf . All of these
steps and others have been taken to address issues of the fairness of credit scoring and to
enlarge the access to mortgage credit for  low- and moderate-income individuals.  And
we believe that these steps have succeeded.
10Statement of Calvin Bradford
President,
Calvin Bradford and Associates, Ltd.
The wide-scale use of credit scoring represents a significant efficiency in the competi-
tive world of mortgage finance. Both the Federal Reserve, in its regulations, and lenders who
use credit scoring refer to it as an objective process as opposed to judgmental systems. The
largest purveyor of credit scores, Fair, Isaac and Company, has continually maintained that its
scores could not be discriminatory because they do not contain race as an explicit variable. All
of these statements appear to support a confidence in the fairness and equality in the use of
credit scoring that is, in fact, unwarranted.
Credit scoring has not been intentionally discriminatory in its typical uses. Nonetheless,
regulators, researchers, and the developers of credit-scoring systems have all recognized that,
on average, minorities have lower credit scores than majority populations. Therefore, the use of
credit-scoring systems will frequently have an overall discriminatory effect. Such an effect,
however, is not illegal if it is based on an overriding business necessity and if there is no less
discriminatory way to achieve the underwriting goal.
With the understanding that all credit-scoring systems need to be calibrated to the par-
ticular population of each individual lender and reevaluated periodically, I offer several repre-
sentative examples of fair lending issues.
Most Rejected Applicants Are Not Expected to Default
Consider the example, which I have made extreme for the sake of clarity, of a lender
who finds that 100 percent of the loans predicted to go into default under its scoring system fall
below the score of 620. This lender would assume that using this scoring model is a great busi-
ness benefit because he could be reasonably confident that the system would exclude all bor-
rowers who might default. Therefore, let us assume that the lender rejects, or “cuts off,” all
applicants with scores under 620.
A scoring system is able to predict, for any cutoff score, the percentage of applicants at
or below that score who are likely to go into default (the odds of defaulting), but it is not able
to precisely identify which specific individuals will default. While 100 percent of those predict-
ed to default may have scores under 620, there are also many other applicants with scores under
620 as well. Indeed, in our example and in reality, whenever a lender chooses a particular cutoff
score, most of the applicants with scores below the cutoff are, in fact, not predicted to default.
In fact, in our example, it is fair to assume that the odds of any particular applicant with a score
below 620 defaulting might be only 10 percent. That is, 90 percent of those with scores below
620 would not be predicted to default.
Credit-Scoring Systems Disproportionately Reject Minority Applicants
Most lenders and secondary investors, as well as those who develop and market scoring
systems, agree that, overall, minorities do have lower credit scores than whites. Suppose that all
minority applicants in a given market, but only some whites, have scores that fall below 620.
Obviously, all minority applicants would be excluded by a 620 cutoff. The lender, however,
would argue that this clearly disproportionate impact on minorities is not unlawfully discrimi-
natory because it is a justifiable business necessity.
To clarify further, let us suppose that 3 percent of all people with any score will default.
Out of 100,000 applicants, this would be 3,000 applicants. Now suppose that, of those 100,000
applicants, 30,000 had scores under 620. If our system predicts that 10 percent of all applicants
under 620 will default, then these 30,000 applicants would include the 3,000 who will default,
as well as 27,000 others who will not. 
11In our example, if the entire population of applicants included 10,000 minorities, all
10,000 would have scores under 620. There would also be 90,000 whites in the population. Of
these, 20,000 would have scores under 620, making up the total of 30,000 applicants with these
scores that we have specified in our example. There would also be 70,000 whites with scores at
or above 620. If the 3,000 borrowers who will default were spread proportionately between
whites and minorities in the group with scores under 620, then 2,000 whites (10 percent) and
1,000 minorities (10 percent) would be predicted to default. There would also be 18,000 whites
and 9,000 minorities with scores under 620 who would not be predicted to default.
In this case, 90 percent of all minorities would be rejected even though the scoring sys-
tem predicted that they would not default. But, of the total of 90,000 whites, only 18,000 with
scores under 620 will be rejected, even though the model predicts that they will not default. The
disparate impact is clear. If all applicants under 620 are rejected, 90 percent of the minority
population, but only 20 percent of the white population, will be rejected when the model pre-
dicts that they will not default on their loans.
Total  Rejects 10% 90% % Rejected
Borrowers (scores<620) Will Default Not Default Due to Score
(score<620) but Not Default
Whites 90,000 20,000 2,000 18,000 20%
Minorities 10,000 10,000 1,000 9,000 90%
Obviously this is an extreme example, but in reality, the difference is only one of
degree. If the Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations permit using a credit-scoring system if
it is statistically reliable, but prohibit a discriminatory impact, absent a clear business necessity,
then where should the “necessity” threshold be set? In other words, what level of differential
impact of rejected good minority applicants to rejected good white applicants is acceptable and
what level crosses over into discrimination? Would it be acceptable in our example to reject all
applicants with a score below 620 because of the ability to weed out all applicants expected to
default, even if 90 percent of the rejected minorities would not be expected to default? Or, on
the other hand, do we decide that unless a credit score can achieve a less discriminatory impact,
it has not achieved enough validity to be accepted? Should we, for example, disallow systems
having a discriminatory impact unless they at least predicted that more than 50 percent of those
with scores below the cutoff would be likely to default? At present, in the real world of credit
scoring, the cutoffs used in prime lending are nowhere near that level of separation; they are
much closer to the 90 percent rejection of predictably good loans used in our example.
Current Systems Measure Default in Discriminatory Ways
Credit systems are actually based on the prediction of early default, not lifetime default.
While early default is important, it generally does not explain most of the loans that go into
default over the life of the loan because most defaults and foreclosures take place several years
into the loan, not in the first 6 to 18 months. Therefore, not only do the present scoring systems
have a discriminatory effect, but they are based on a default of only a few months against loans
that typically last for several years — and that last even longer for minorities who buy, sell, and
refinance less often than whites.
As a measure of early default, credit scores do not incorporate many of the factors that
research suggests cause most defaults: job loss, temporary or long-term unemployment,
divorce, and so on. Because these factors are rarely part of credit bureau databases used in 
scoring models, such factors are not part of the scoring process. Of course, these events and
factors are often not items that could be used in a score at the time of application
because they are events and activities that have not yet happened. The result is that the
Summary of Calvin Bradford’s Example
12scoring models are not actually predicting default altogether, but only that part of default that
can be related to data stored in credit bureaus, and then only inasmuch as the defaults show up
very early in the life of the loan.
Many “Predictive” Factors Used in Systems May Have No Causal
Connection with Default
In social science research, the critical issue of the explanatory power of statistical mod-
els relates to the linkage between correlation and causation. Credit-score developers try to
squeeze all the correlation they can out of the limited set of factors stored at credit bureaus. In
a general sense, they may seem to match correlation with causation, such as in the apparent
logic between linking future credit performance to past performance. Still, many correlations
raise serious questions of causal relationships. For example, where there is a correlation
between the number of inquiries and later default, for some applicants, this may reflect
attempts by a person with poor credit habits searching for an acceptance. For others, numerous
inquiries may represent the impact of discrimination that forces borrowers to contact more
lenders in a search of a fair loan.
In one historical file, I saw an applicant with a low score where the main factor was 
listed as too many open lines of credit. After the person had consolidated his debts, credit
bureaus continued to generate low scores on the basis that he now had too few credit lines.
Although debt consolidation is often recommended by credit counselors, the result in this case
was lower scores, even though this applicant had never had a delinquent account. Credit-scor-
ing companies, lenders, and investors often respond to such examples by insisting that their
models are complex and not subject to simple understanding. We need to ask, however, as a
matter of policy whether, if we accept a scoring system because of its claimed statistical relia-
bility, we really are accepting correlation without requiring a sound basis for causation. Why
should we accept a process with a clearly discriminatory effect when it fails to meet the social
science test of having a demonstrable linkage to causation?
Scoring Models Based on Non-Mortgage Credit Are Not Likely to Predict
Mortgagor Behavior as Well
Most credit-scoring models are not geared to mortgage loans but to all credit.
Minorities stay in their homes longer than whites. Many lenders, counselors, and other players
in the home sales market have perceived that a home is treated differently by many moderate-
income and lower-income buyers — who are also disproportionately minority — than by high-
er-income buyers. The home is more than a commodity that can be replaced, for these buyers.
More sacrifice may be made to keep the home than to protect other forms of credit from
default. This is an example of just one aspect of lending that may separate the treatment of
home loan credit from other forms of credit for minorities. Credit scoring used in mortgage
loans needs to be based on mortgage loans, and perhaps even loans for the same type of mort-
gage product, in order to develop patterns that truly reflect mortgage risk.
Credit Scoring Ignores Change in Borrower Behavior
Scoring systems do not account for the ability of interventions to change behavior. For
example, many lenders and special loan programs have discovered that pre-purchase counsel
ing (when done well) and post-default counseling or interventions (when done rapidly at the
point of first delinquency) can substantially reduce the likelihood of default or the likelihood
that a default will result in foreclosure. Since these types of programs have been disproportion-
ately targeted to minorities (usually either by the effect of geographic area or income targets),
the failure to account for this ability to change predicted behavior results in credit scores
imposing a discriminatory effect when less discriminatory alternatives exist. This undermines
the business necessity argument for the use of credit scores in an environment where they have
a discriminatory effect.
13Industry Claims That Scoring Frees Time to Spend on Applicants with
Problems Are Unrealistic
The speed and economy of using credit scores is alleged to free up lenders to spend
more time with those whose credit histories need more work. But, in a market of extreme com-
petition and with a growing range of products for all credit scores, lenders are less likely to use
the system to devote real time to problem scores than they are to simply divert those with low
scores to higher-cost loan programs. They are, for example, not as likely as in the past to review
the accuracy and basis of credit issues or even to ask borrowers to verify that derogatory infor-
mation in their accounts are, indeed, the applicant's accounts and that they are correct. Lenders
also are not as likely as with non-scoring underwriting to ask for explanations of credit issues.
Therefore, credit blemishes that in the past were considered acceptable because they were not
the fault of the borrower or were considered temporary — such as a death in the family, medical
bills, or temporary unemployment — may now simply be counted against the borrower in the
same way that a voluntary disregard for credit would tarnish the borrower’s credit history. We
know from socioeconomic studies and health studies, for example, that minorities suffer loss of
job and serious medical bills more often than the majority population.
Correcting bad information can be hard and time-consuming. The lender may also be
concerned that the investor purchasing the loan will not have access to the corrected informa-
tion or may secure a score from another credit bureau that does not contain the corrected infor-
mation. Therefore, in a random quality control audit or in a review if the loan goes into default,
the lender may face negative ratings or even the requirement to repurchase the loan. Inasmuch
as the need to deal with derogatory credit is more likely to come about for minorities, the lender
may want to find ways to respond to the application that avoid the effort of verifying and cor-
recting bad credit. This may lead to rejection or to encouraging the applicant to withdraw the
loan at the earliest time in the application process. Alternatively, when faced with low credit
scores, a lender may introduce a judgmental system of overrides, which can introduce discrimi-
nation into the system.
Rather than reject a loan with credit issues, a lender may steer the borrower away from
prime conventional products toward FHA or subprime products, rather than try to deal with
investigating a low credit score or correcting bad information. This would have the effect of
imposing higher rates or more onerous terms on the borrower, or it could con-
tribute to concentrations of FHA loans in minority areas — which have histori-
cally been shown to have an adverse effect on both the borrowers and the 
community. Recent studies indicate a similar concentration of subprime lend-
ing in minority communities, with similar adverse impacts.
These are some examples of how credit scores, both directly and indi-
rectly, may have a discriminatory impact or may lead to differential treatment.
The potential for discrimination and liability should not be ignored, either as
an internal part of the scoring system or in the manner in which it is applied.
Ellen Roche: Response to Statement of Calvin Bradford
In his essay, Calvin Bradford poses an important question when he
asks where the line should be drawn between approval and rejection. However, we must be
careful not to oversimplify our consideration of this important issue.
Credit scores represent a leap forward in efficiency and access to the mortgage market
compared to manual or judgmental underwriting. We should not be satisfied with our current
achievements and should continue to work to increase the speed and fairness. However, in our
efforts to critique the current arrangements, we should consider the alternatives.  If we set an
arbitrary standard for scoring systems, lenders might be forced to return to manual underwrit-
ing — a slower and more subjective approach to underwriting. We want to move forward and
improve the current systems.  Fortunately, scoring systems will improve over time, because
competition will drive lenders and investors to develop more accurate risk assessments.  14Statement of Peter L. McCorkell
Executive Vice President & General Counsel,
Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc.
During the 1970s and 1980s, credit scoring and automated underwriting became widely
accepted for most forms of consumer lending, other than mortgages. Mortgage lenders began
using credit scoring much later, starting around 1995. Lenders have widely accepted scoring
technology because it allows for expanded lending while maintaining or even reducing loss
rates.  In the years that credit-scoring technology was being developed, there were few, if any,
serious concerns on the part of regulators or consumer activists that scoring might somehow
restrict access to credit for any significant subset of the population.  However, in the past four
or five years, such concerns have been raised more and more frequently.
Consumer and Regulatory Concerns
Most regulators and consumer activists accept the claims of lenders and scoring-system
developers that credit scoring provides an effective and cost-efficient decision tool for the gen-
eral population of borrowers. But, when it comes to traditionally underserved segments of the
population, they may become very skeptical.  Most of these concerns can be grouped into a
few broad categories:
How can a statistically based system deal with segments of the population that are
unrepresented or underrepresented in the historical data?
This is a reasonable question, but it is premised on a hidden assumption. The assump-
tion is that when underrepresented groups seek mainstream credit, the factors that predict good
and bad performance will be different for them than what has proved predictive for past bor-
rowers.  Clearly, there are some differences in what is predictive for various sub-populations.
However, more than 40 years of experience in developing credit-scoring systems for lenders in
60 countries have demonstrated that the similarities in what is predictive of credit performance
outweigh the differences. The same question can be applied to individual applicants: “If an
applicant has little or no mainstream credit history, how can a scoring system evaluate such an
applicant?” Again, the question has a hidden premise that satisfactory performance with non-
traditional obligations will predict satisfactory performance with traditional credit obligations.
Since there is little, if any, systematic collection of nontraditional credit histories, no one really
knows whether that premise is correct. 
Credit bureau-based scoring systems require a minimum amount of reported credit his-
tory in order to produce a score. An “unable to score” code should trigger a judgmental evalu-
ation, but that may not always happen.  Bureau scoring systems may also employ separate
scorecards for “thin file” populations, and special application scorecards have been developed
for “no hit” populations — those with no credit bureau history.
Don’t inaccuracies in credit bureau data result in inaccurate scores?
Of course inaccurate data will cause inaccurate scores, but inaccurate data also affect
judgmental credit decisions.  However, the current use of scoring in mortgage lending does
produce some real differences.  For example, prior to the use of credit scores in mortgage origi-
nation, when an applicant disputed information in the credit report the underwriter could
choose to disregard that information. Alternatively, the provider of the merged credit report
usually used in mortgage lending might have been willing to change the data in that report,
even though the credit repositories had not made a corresponding change.
Now that the credit bureau-based score is the primary tool for evaluating the credit his-
tory of mortgage applicants, the score will not change unless and until the data in the underly-
ing repository report are changed. The major secondary market lenders — principally Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac — as well as scoring developers have advised originators that they can
and should ignore scores based on inaccurate data.  However, some underwriters may
not make the effort needed to document such cases to satisfy a potential investor. 15Aren’t there inequities in overrides, quality of assistance, and so on?
Even in a situation where a scoring system encompasses substantially all of the available
information and can account for most of the final decisions, there is still room for human inter-
vention.  An override occurs when the final decision is contrary to that indicated by the scoring
system.  Scoring developers would argue that overrides are not a scoring problem but rather a
problem caused by ignoring the scoring system.  The September 1999 complaint and consent
decree by the U.S. Department of Justice against Deposit Guaranty National Bank supports the
argument of scoring developers that overrides — that is, judgmental decisions — may be more
vulnerable to discrimination claims than decisions that follow the scoring system. 
Similarly, there have been many claims that the “quality of assistance” offered to minor-
ity borrowers is systematically inferior to the assistance offered to white borrowers.  While sub-
stantively that issue is no different in a scored environment than in a judgmental environment,
the scoring system may nevertheless be perceived as the culprit by rejected minority borrowers.
Don’t scoring systems reject many applicants who would have performed well and accept many
who go delinquent?
The short answer to the question is, “Yes.” But the question should be whether credit
scoring or human judgment does a better job of accepting “good” borrowers and turning away
those who would, if accepted, eventually perform badly.  Here the evidence is clear: The use of
scoring consistently produces 20 to 30 percent improvements — either in reduced delinquency
rates or increased acceptance rates — compared with judgmental evaluation.  In addition, the
available data suggest that similar or even greater improvements can be obtained by applying
scoring to traditionally underserved segments of the population.
Doesn’t scoring result in higher reject rates for certain minorities than for whites?
Again, the short answer is, “Yes,” but it is the wrong question.  The question ought to
be: “Does credit scoring produce an accurate assessment of credit risk regardless of race,
national origin, etc.?” Studies conducted by Fair, Isaac, and Company, Inc. (discussed in more
detail below) strongly suggest that scoring is both fair and effective in assessing the credit risk
of lower-income and/or minority applicants. 
Unfortunately, income, property, education, and employment are not equally distributed
by race/national origin in the United States. Since all of these factors influence a borrower’s
ability to meet financial obligations, it is unreasonable to expect an objective assessment of
credit risk to result in equal acceptance and rejection rates across socioeconomic or race/nation-
al origin lines. By definition, low-income borrowers are economically disadvantaged, so one
would not expect their score distributions to mirror those of higher-income borrowers.
Is Scoring “Fair” to Minority and Low-Income Borrowers?
Since scoring systems are designed to provide the most accurate possible assessment of
credit risk — regardless of race, national origin, and so on — they will never satisfy critics who
believe “fair” means the elimination of all discrepancies in both acceptance and rejection rates.
If, however, “fair” is defined as “assesses credit risk consistently regardless of race, national ori-
gin, or income” then the available data strongly suggest that credit-scoring systems are fair
when applied to these borrowers.  Two research studies conducted by Fair, Isaac and Company,
Inc. early in 1996 support this finding.
The first study used data from more than 20 credit portfolios to look at score distribu-
tions and differences in characteristics between low- and moderate-income (“LMI”) applicants
and the general population.  This study (hereinafter, the “LMI study”) also compared the accep-
tance rates and default rates for LMI segments resulting from actual judgmental underwriting
on eight of these portfolios with the results that could have been obtained using scoring.
16Not surprisingly, the score distribution of the LMI segment was lower than that of the
general population.  Thus, at any given cut-off score, the LMI population would have a lower
acceptance rate.  However, the score-to-odds relationships* of the LMI and general populations
were virtually identical (especially in the range where most cutoff scores would be set).  To the
extent there were any differences in the score-to-odds relationships, those discrepancies consis-
tently favored the LMI applicants.  That is, at any given score, the risk for LMI applicants is the
same as or slightly greater than the risk for other applicants.  
The second half of the LMI study produced some very interesting results.  For the eight
different portfolios, we compared acceptance and delinquency rates for LMI borrowers that had
resulted from judgmental underwriting with the results that would have been obtained if credit
scoring had been used to evaluate the same applicants. In every case, scoring could have pro-
duced a significant increase in the acceptance rate for LMI applicants if the bad rate were held
constant, or a significant decrease in the bad rate if the acceptance rate were held constant.  
The second study (hereinafter, the “HMA study”) compared credit bureau scores and
characteristics of consumers living in zip codes with high concentrations of blacks and
Hispanics (the “HMA zip codes”) against those of consumers living in other zip codes.  Zip
code was used as a surrogate for race/national origin simply because direct race/national origin
information was not available. The average household income (as indicated by census data) in
HMA zip codes was only about two-thirds that for the non-HMA zip codes.  Once again, while
the score distribution for the HMA zip codes was lower than for the non-HMA zip codes, the
score-to-odds relationships were very similar across populations.  As in the LMI study, what
discrepancies did exist in the score-to-odds relationships consistently favored the HMA popula-
tion: At any given score, HMA borrowers present the same or greater risk as non-HMA borrow-
ers receiving the same score.
Conclusion
In short, these studies indicate that scoring is both fair and effective when applied to
LMI and minority populations.  These findings are consistent with results reported by others,
including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (where direct race/national origin information is avail-
able from HMDA data).  Moreover, the LMI study indicates that scoring can produce substan-
tial improvements in the quality of decisions when compared with judgmental underwriting.
Despite guidance from secondary market investors and scoring developers, at least some
mortgage lenders are overly reliant on credit scores.  The scores most often used in mortgage
lending are “generic” bureau-based scores that consider only credit history information, and
were not designed specifically to assess mortgage risk. Ignoring other relevant information in
the mortgage decision process is not in the best interests of either borrowers or lenders.  And in
cases where the lender is satisfied that inaccuracies exist in the underlying credit information on
which the score is based, it is irrational to continue to rely on the score.  But
there is evidence that many lenders do not make the effort to manually review
and document these cases. 
These problems may be exacerbated if overrides and assistance are also
not dispensed evenly; higher-income white borrowers may be approved despite
marginal credit scores, while low-income and minority borrowers with similar
scores are turned away.  Such practices would better be described as the misuse
of scoring, but the rejected applicant is still left with the perception that the
credit scoring system is unfair.
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* Editor’s Note: The term score-to-odds relationship refers to the relationship
between any given credit score and the degree to which applicants with that score are
likely to exhibit the risk that the scoring system is designed to predict.  For example,
in a system designed to predict the likelihood – or “odds” – that an applicant will
default on a loan within two years, a score of 700 might relate to or predict a 1 per-
cent likelihood of default, while a score of 660 might relate to a 3 percent likelihood
of default. In such an example, the default risk “odds” would be 1 in 100 for a score
of 700 and 3 in 100 for a score of 660. 18
Calvin Bradford: Response to Statement of Peter L. McCorkell
The response from Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc. made reference to specific
studies that supported its claim that minorities were not unfairly disadvantaged by credit
scoring systems.  Since Fair, Isaac is asserting that their research is sound in a statistical
and social science context, one needs to assess whether their studies measure up by
these standards.  
For example, in the above-referenced LMI study, we are told only that the data
are from several unnamed lenders for some unnamed type of installment loans from
1992 to 1994.  Are these mortgage loans, auto loans, personal loans, home equity loans,
student loans?  Different loan types attract different types of applicants.  The study
reviews characteristics taken from credit applications and credit bureau information, but
it provides no definitions of any of these characteristics.  We are not told if all the
lenders used compatible application forms with common definitions for each character-
istic. We are provided with tables (in the referenced LMI study) that indicate which
applicant and credit bureau characteristics made “large differences,” “moderate differ-
ences,” and “negligible differences.” We are given numbers, but we do not know if these
numbers are from tests of significance, differences in raw percentages, or some other
collection of measures.  
The comparison of the outcomes for the judgmental and credit scoring system
was actually done in a separate study based on data from lenders seeking to replace their
judgmental system.  This is a clearly biased sample. Were these judgmental systems
among the most subjective and least structured in the industry?  The indication is that
the lenders already saw them as failures.
The above-referenced HMA study of minority differences was based on ZIP
codes, where all residents of the ZIP code were treated as either minority or not.  Yet the
minority composition of the ZIP codes ranged from 40 percent to 90 percent, with the
report data based on ZIP codes more than 70 percent black and Hispanic. We are not
told what percent of all minorities live in such ZIP codes.  Such a grouping is not specif-
ic with respect to the race of individuals.  Only large segregated minority populations
would be included in such definitions.  This is likely to exclude the majority of
Hispanics and most higher-income minorities.  We are not told the time period for the
data in this study. The markets are constantly changing.  Subprime lending, which was
seen in these studies as related to personal finance companies, now relates to a large and
rapidly growing industry of subprime lenders providing everything from home purchase
loans to auto title loans.  Therefore, one historical study is not adequate, even if it was
sound at the time.
Fair, Isaac’s response emphasizes the need for a broad range of
studies by researchers from different perspectives and disciplines.  Until
this happens, the Fair, Isaac claims of a neutral, or even favorable, treat-
ment of minorities should be treated with skepticism.  Fair, Isaac, like
Freddie Mac, needs to seek out a broader range of perspectives for its own
reviews.  The true test for credit scoring, however, will lie in the continu-
ing review of many different systems by many different researchers. 
This concludes the introductory installment of Perspectives on
Credit Scoring and Fair Lending: A Five-Part Article Series. The Federal
Reserve System’s Mortgage Credit Partnership Credit Scoring Committee
would like to thank the respondents for their participation. In the next article we will
explore the interrelated issues of lending policy, credit-scoring model development, and
model maintenance.AROUND NEW ENGLAND
Cohousing: A New Kind of Old Neighborhood
America has sometimes found the idea of community stifling. The United States has grown
committed to the ideal of individual privacy.  In real estate, the American Dream is a single-family
house on a large lot.  However, the dream does not fit the new American reality. A nuclear family with
one working parent, one stay-at-home parent and 2.6 children is no longer the norm.  Many adults,
with and without families, find suburban living an isolating experience. They yearn for a more con-
nected community as in days gone by.
Cohousing addresses that need.  Cohousing is a term coined by the husband and wife architec-
tural team, Kathryn McCamant and Charles Durett.  The cohousing movement in the U.S. began when
McCamant and Durett wrote a book called Cohousing: A Contemporary Approach to Housing
Ourselves after visiting similar projects developed in Denmark.  In Denmark, bofoellesskabers or liv-
ing communities began in the 1970s in response to sterile suburban developments. 
Description of Cohousing
The cohousing concept is similar to a condominium complex with more advanced bylaws.  A
typical cohousing community contains about three dozen individual homes.  In addition to the homes,
there is a central facility with a community kitchen and dining area called the common house. The
common house may also contain playrooms, a workshop, a gym, shared laundry facilities, guestrooms,
or anything else the community decides upon.  The homes are generally built close together, allowing
for larger open spaces.  Instead of individual postage-stamp yards, there is one large shared yard.
Many cohouses also have community gardens.
Living in cohousing requires a commitment to the community. At least three nights per week,
dinner is served in the main dining room.  Community members are expected to make a couple of
meals per month and to help clean up periodically.  Cohousing has lower maintenance fees because 
residents participate in maintaining the lawn and grounds.
During the planning stage, cohousing communities decide how many families with children and
how many older and single people will be part of the community. The group attempts to create a bal-
ance.  In addition, the groups seeks economic diversity by subsidizing the cost of some units and
spreading the cost among the market rate units.
The community functions as an almost pure democracy. The group holds monthly meetings
and must reach consensus to make major decisions.  Residents join committees based on their interests,
such as planning and design, programming, or social life.
Starting a Cohousing Development
A cohousing group usually begins when several individuals or families decide to live together 
in an organized manner.  However, many members, such as Gwen Noyes of Cambridge Cohousing, say
they were always interested in living this way. The cohousing book gave it a name and legitimacy.
The Cohousing Network, a national organization based in Colorado, supports the movement.
The Network has a quarterly newsletter and a web site (www.cohousing.org).  In the Boston area, the
network holds periodic informational sessions .  
Building the bricks and mortar community of a cohousing group generally requires two to three
years.  The group must find land that is usable and acceptable, pay for the land, hire a develop-
er, decide on the layout, and execute construction.  Many cohousing groups have a developer or
architect as part of their cohousing community. 19The development of other cohousing groups, especially in the western United States, is often
“streamlined.” For example, a developer presents a plan for the community, which a group may accept
or reject.  Since the group does not participate in site selection or design, the time required to develop a
cohousing community is greatly reduced.
In a non-streamlined cohousing development, members must contribute a substantial amount of
time and money to the project, before it is in operation.  Many groups pay up to 30 percent of the esti-
mated value of their unit to fund land acquisition and development costs.  Lenders for the construction
loan require alternative security.  Finally, lenders require that over 90 percent of the units be sold prior
to construction.
Cohousing in New England
Despite the time and money needed to create a cohousing community, several  have been com-
pleted in Massachusetts. The first urban cohousing community on the East Coast was completed last
year in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Two established communities are also in western Massachusetts.
There is also a cohousing community in Acton, Massachusetts called New View.
The Cambridge project provides an excellent example of both how cohousing is created and
some of the problems it faces.  A developer and architect, Gwen Noyes, formed the Cambridge group in
1997.  She contacted her church, Cambridge Friends Meeting, and received permission to hold meetings
at the church.  Noyes used the Cohousing Network’s mailing list to invite interested participants.  When
enough qualified buyers began to attend regular meetings, the project got under way.
The first challenge that the cohouse faced was finding a piece of land large enough to accommo-
date a 40-unit development in an urban setting. The group settled on a parcel of land abutting railroad
tracks in a rundown area outside Porter Square.  Before closing on their land, the cohousing group met
their neighbors, showed them the plans for the community, answered their questions, and listened close-
ly to the neighbors’concerns.
Many members of the cohousing movement believe that the general public views them with sus-
picion because of misconceptions.  As Gwen Noyes states, people wonder “who are these people who
like to cooperate?” Others have been more blunt, labeling cohousing participants as communists and
worrying about religious zealots, communes, and drug users. When the Cambridge cohousing group 
met their neighbors, they were able to dispel some of the myths of cohousing. The group has an 80-
year-old member, children, working professionals, a handicapped person — in short, a wide variety res-
idents. 
The group marketed themselves to neighbors by providing a human face to development.  They
pointed out that the cohouse was less dense than a proposed condominium development.  The developer
used a plan that did not require any special zoning to keep the process as short as possible.
Once the group received approval for the plans, construction began.  The developers used pre-
fabricated modules assembled at the site to keep costs down and quality high.  However, even
with attempts at economy, construction was expensive. The final cost of the project was over $9
million.  This posed a problem for another cohousing goal, that of economic diversity. 20
Artist rendering of the proposed Cornerstone Village Cohousing development in North Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Construction is set to begin in September of 2000. Courtesy of Elton & Associates, Architects. 21
In other cohousing developments, the community provided some affordable units by raising the
price of the other units.  For example, if 30 market rate units paid $3,000 more, $90,000 was available
to decrease the cost of affordable units.  In the case of Cambridge, however, this was not possible. The
cost of acquiring land and constructing units was so high that members could not subsidize affordable
units.  A creative solution was needed.
The City of Cambridge's Housing Authority solved the problem by purchasing two units.  The
Housing Authority rents the units at subsidized rates to eligible low-income households.  In addition to
the two rental units, one limited equity apartment is subsidized by the City. Another two units are
owned by a group of mentally-challenged men living with care providers.  
The Cohousing group committed itself to family diversity as well.  One-third of the units are
reserved for families with children, one-third are reserved for couples, and one-third are designated for
single people.
The result is a beautiful new set of buildings, which has turned a vacant lot that once collected
trash into a new community asset.  After one year, a unit resold to a new family. The owner was
allowed by the community to sell at market rate. The seller received $450,000 for a unit with a con-
struction cost of $375,000.  While this is a significant profit, the seller also worked for as many as 20
hours per week to assist in the development process. 
Another Cambridge project, which began in 1993, has not been quite so successful.
Cornerstone Village is a group trying to build a cohousing development in North Cambridge.  However,
unlike Cambridge Cohousing, the group has met with stiff opposition from neighbors who objected to
the density of the development.  Recently, however, the group and their neighbors have agreed to drop
their lawsuit, and construction on the 32-unit site is expected to begin in the fall.  
Conclusion
Cohousing is a lifestyle choice for individuals seeking more social interaction within their
neighborhoods. However, while cohousing communities seek diversity, they are predominantly the bas-
tion of upper-middle-class homeowners.  In Denmark, the cohousing movement has been able to estab-
lish limited equity cohouses and to mix more rentals with ownership opportunities.  In the United
States, the experiment of cohousing will need time to gather more supporters before this next step is
taken.  Perhaps as the trend catches on, there will be more opportunities for lower-income individuals
to participate in these cohousing developments. 
--by Kathleen Gill
Public & Community Affairs
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
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Regulation Z: Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
Q. Are transactions commonly known as “payday loans” considered credit for 
purposes of Regulation Z?
A. Yes. Payday loans, which are short-term cash advances, are considered credit and 
are covered under Regulation Z.  The regulation defines credit as the right to defer pay-
ment of debt or the right to incur debt and defer its payment.  When a payday loan is 
extended, the consumer typically receives a short-term cash advance in exchange for 
his/her personal check and a fee, or in exchange for the consumer’s authorization to 
debit his/her checking account for the amount of the advance plus a fee.  In both 
cases, the parties agree that the check will not be cashed or the account will not be 
debited until a future designated date. Accordingly, payday loans and similar transac-
tions where there is an agreement to defer payment of a debt constitute credit for pur-
poses of Regulation Z.  Note that extending payday loans is illegal in some states,
including Massachusetts.
Q. Are lien discharge fees considered finance charges under Regulation Z?
A. Yes.  Lien discharge fees generally fall within the definition of a finance charge
under the regulation.  A finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a dollar 
amount.  It includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and 
imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or condition of the 
extension of credit.  A finance charge is a fee that would not be paid in a comparable 
cash transaction.  
A lien discharge fee is a condition of an extension of credit.  It would not be assessed in 
a cash transaction.  A lien discharge fee, however, can be excluded from the finance 
charge as a security interest charge, if the fee is itemized and disclosed and is paid to a 
public official to release the security interest. 
Q. If a person obtains a business loan secured by his principal dwelling, is the 
loan rescindable under Regulation Z?
A. No.  The protections under Regulation Z generally apply to consumer credit —
credit offered or extended to a consumer primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes.  Extensions of credit primarily for business or commercial purposes are
specifically exempted from the scope of the regulations.  Accordingly, a business-
purpose loan does not fall within this definition, and therefore Regulation Z does not 
apply. Credit extensions that are not subject to Regulation Z are not covered by the 
rescission provisions even if the customer’s principal dwelling is the collateral securing 
the credit.  
Homeowners Protection Act:
Q. The Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 requires that lenders provide cer-
tain disclosures and notifications concerning private mortgage insurance (PMI) on
loans consummated on or after July 29, 1999.  Do the provisions apply to loans
extended prior to July 29, 1999?  22
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COMPLIANCE CORNERA. The Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 requires that borrowers receive initial 
amortization schedules and disclosures concerning cancellation of PMI at the time of 
loan consummation and additional disclosures annually for loans secured by the con-
sumer’s primary residence consummated on or after July 29, 1999.  The law requires 
banks to disclose the date at which borrowers can expect automatic termination of their 
PMI.  In addition, bank customers can request PMI cancellation at 80 percent loan-to-
value, provided certain conditions are met. 
There are no provisions requiring automatic termination of PMI for loans consummated 
prior to July 29, 1999.  The Act does contain disclosure provisions for residential mort-
gages consummated before July 29, 1999.  If PMI was required, the servicer must dis-
close the following to the borrower in an annual statement:
• • That the PMI may be canceled by the borrower under certain circumstances with con-
sent of the lender or in accordance with state law; and
• • An address and telephone number that the borrower may use to contact the servicer to 
determine whether the borrower may cancel the PMI.
Regulation C:  Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
Q. For purposes of HMDA reporting, are structures such as nursing homes, dormitories,
or timeshares considered dwellings?
A. With respect to nursing homes and dormitories, the institution need not treat these 
structures as dwellings for HMDA reporting purposes.  If, however, the institution wants 
to report these transactions, it must determine that the structure is a residential structure
under state or federal law. The purchase of a timeshare, however, is the purchase of a 
“use” of the property.  It is therefore not considered a dwelling for HMDA purposes. 
Q. How should a bank report the property location for the purchase of three separate two-
unit dwellings?  
A. When the loan is to purchase multiple properties and is secured by multiple properties,
the institution reports the location of one of the properties or reports the loan using multi-
ple entries on its HMDA-LAR, allocating the loan amount among the properties.  
Regulation H: Flood Hazard Determination
Q. How would a consumer contest a lender’s determination that his property is located in 
a special flood hazard area?
A. The consumer can verify a lender’s flood hazard determination by contacting his/her 
local government department that has the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) available 
for viewing.  Departments having these maps available may include building permit, pub-
lic works, engineering or planning departments.  If the consumer’s building is located in 
a special flood hazard area (zones A or V), flood hazard insurance is required. The bor-
rower should ask the community official if there has been a Letter of Map Amendment 
(LOMA) or Letter of Map Revision (LOMR).
If the consumer believes there is adequate documentation indicating that the prop-
erty is not in a flood zone, he/she can request a LOMA application by calling FEMA 
((415) 923-7177); the National Flood Insurance Program Map Service Center ((800) 480-2520); 
or by accessing the FEMA web site (www.fema.gov).  The consumer may include with 
his/her application a copy of the lender’s letter indicating that the building is in a special 
flood hazard area. 
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Regulation BB: Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
Q. Under the CRA, what type of credit would a depository institution receive for its 
involvement in either the promotion or provision of individual development 
accounts (IDAs)?
A. IDAs are basically savings programs, matched by government funds, for low- and 
moderate-income (LMI) individuals who are saving for a defined purpose. Usually
this is limited to saving for a down payment on a home, for educational expenses,
or for capitalizing a small business venture.  Most financial institutions involved in 
IDAs work in conjunction with a nonprofit community-based organization that will
recruit IDA participants and monitor their progress.  The bank may also match the 
participant’s deposit up to a certain amount (depending on the structure of the IDA
program), and then receive federal tax credits for all matching funds provided.
The extent of financial institutions’ involvement in IDAs and the products and ser-
vices they offer in connection with the accounts will vary. Thus, subject to 
s. 345.23(b), examiners evaluate the actual services and products provided by an 
institution in connection with IDA programs as one or more of the following: com-
munity development services, retail banking services, qualified investments, home 
mortgage loans, small business loans, consumer loans, or community development 
loans. For further information see the Interagency Questions and Answers
Regarding Community Reinvestment.
Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers
Q. A consumer purchased a one year magazine subscription with her debit card. At
the end of the subscription period, the magazine company withdrew payment 
electronically for a second year without her authorization.  The consumer 
requested that the bank reverse the debit.  What is the bank’s responsibility?
A. Essentially, the consumer is asserting an unauthorized electronic fund transfer, and 
as such, the bank is required to comply with the procedures for resolving errors
under s. 205.11.  Provided that the consumer brought the error to the bank’s
attention within 60 days after the periodic statement on which the alleged error is 
reflected, the bank is required to investigate and determine whether an error 
occurred within ten business days of having received notice. If the bank is unable 
to complete its investigation within those ten days, it must provisionally credit the 
account and has 45 days from notice to investigate and make a determination.
Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions
Q. According to Regulation D, a depositor is permitted to make no more than 6 
transfers and withdrawals per calendar month or statement cycle from a savings 
account, a passbook savings account or a money market deposit account.  Do 
ATM withdrawals count toward the six transactions?
A. No.  Withdrawals or transfers by ATM, mail, messenger, or in person, or with-
drawals made by telephone (provided that the funds withdrawn are mailed via 
check to the depositor), are not counted toward the six-transaction maximum.
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